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In a thought-provoking paper published recently, Kai A. Konrad et al. (2002) coined the
notion of the “geography of the family”. Their starting point is the observation that in
many families, when parents grow old, the problem of taking care of the elderly emerges.
Adult children care about the well-being of their parents, but make irreversible location
decisions long before the care is needed. These decisions are key determinants of the cost
of contributing to parental care. In families with more than one child, the well-being
of elderly parents is a public good, and caregiving becomes a contribution game played
between siblings. Adult children may, therefore, take strategic steps to alter their costs
as contributors to their parents’ care before their parents age and the need for assistance
arises. Konrad et al. (2002) argue that ﬁrstborn siblings may have a ﬁrst-mover advantage
and may choose to raise their costs as contributors to care by locating at some critical
distance from their parents. Second-born siblings are, thereby, forced to stay close to their
parents and to provide all the care in the later contribution game. This precommitment
strategy adopted by older siblings—similar to the idea of “burning bridges” (Schelling,
1980)—generates a geography of the family whereby ﬁrstborn children consistently locate
further away from their parents than second-born or only children. Empirical evidence,
based on data drawn from the German Ageing Survey, shows that adult children’s location
choices are in line with this prediction.
This paper takes these theoretical ideas and empirical results as its starting point
and conducts a cross-national econometric analysis of intrafamily location and caregiving
patterns. The analysis has three aims. First, we assess, from an international perspective,
the relationship between family structure and the geographic proximity between adult
children and their parents. We should be clear that with the term family structure we
refer, in this paper, to the presence of a sibling, birth order, and sibship sex composition.
Second, we examine whether diﬀerences in family structure aﬀect the amount of informal
care provided by adult children to their elderly parents. Third, we look for cross-country
diﬀerences in family location and caregiving patterns, and interpret observed diﬀerences in
terms of heterogenous institutional solutions to the long-term care problem. For example,
if the public sector plays a minor role in caring for the elderly, family background might be
expected to be an important factor in determining the location and caregiving choices of
adult children. Conversely, if the care responsibilities of the public sector are well deﬁned
and explicit, family structure should, theoretically, play a relatively minor role.
Looking at the role and impact of family structure ties in well with more general
debates about the impact of current demographic changes on future generations. It is
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families in many industrialized countries place many adult children in an unprecedented
situation with respect to parent-care activities. Indeed, more and more adult children are
likely to have at least one parent who survives into old age but no sibling with whom to
share caregiving responsibilities. Should we, as a consequence, expect future generations
to constrain their mobility decisions because of eldercare obligations? And if so, could this
have additional consequences for the earnings potential of individuals in small families?
An answer to these questions requires, ﬁrst of all, an understanding of whether and how
family structure aﬀects the location and caregiving choices of adult children.
The data we use in this study comes from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retire-
ment in Europe (SHARE). This is a cross-national database which provides micro data on
health, socio-economic status and the social and family networks of elderly individuals.
We restrict our sample to parents with one or two biological children. Our estimation
sample comprises roughly 10,000 individuals in 10 countries representing various regions
in Europe, ranging from Scandinavia (Sweden, Denmark) through Central Europe (Aus-
tria, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands) to the Mediterranean (Spain, Italy,
Greece). Our empirical analysis exploits the substantial variation across families in terms
of presence of a sibling, birth order, and sibship sex composition. We also exploit the fact
that informal and formal care systems for the support of the elderly are diﬀerent from
country to country. This allows us to examine how family structure and institutional
background interact in aﬀecting location and caregiving patterns in families.
Overall, our results provide a new empirical perspective on the geography of the family.
They also give novel insights into how family-related factors shape patterns of caregiving to
ageing parents. Particularly worth mentioning are the following ﬁve ﬁndings: ﬁrst, regres-
sion results for the majority of individual countries and the pooled cross-country sample
suggest that the single most inﬂuential family-related factor determining intra-family lo-
cation patterns is the presence of a sibling. Indeed, for most countries we consistently ﬁnd
that children with a sibling are signiﬁcantly more likely to live further away from their
elderly parents than only children. For example, our pooled country analysis shows that
adult children with a sibling have a 5 percentage point higher probability of living more
than 100 kilometres away from their parents than only children. Second, in line with the
family location pattern just described, we also ﬁnd evidence that actual time transfers to
elderly parents are signiﬁcantly lower among siblings than among only children. Third,
while children with siblings appear to behave intrinsically diﬀerently than only children,
there is no signiﬁcant asymmetry in the behavior of ﬁrstborn and second-born siblings in
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gender composition of sibships has no discernable eﬀect on location choices and patterns
of caregiving to older parents. Finally, we show that cross-country diﬀerences in institu-
tional solutions to the elderly care problem are reﬂected in family location and caregiving
patterns. Indeed, in countries where the care responsibilities of the public sector are well
deﬁned and explicit, family structure has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the location and care-
giving choices of adult children. In contrast, where adult children have legal maintenance
responsibilities towards their parents, diﬀerent conﬁgurations of family size signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence the patterns of mobility and caregiving of adult children.
Taken together, these results are at odds with the view that older siblings may use
their location choices to force younger siblings into staying close to their parents and
providing the lion’s share of care. What we ﬁnd is that the presence of a sibling matters
more for location and caregiving choices than birth order. This result may be due to a
number of factors. First, in addition to the birth order eﬀect described by Konrad et al.
(2002), there may be other strategic aspects of family life. Rainer and Siedler (2009) build
a simple model in which adult siblings compete in location and employment decisions so
as to aﬀect the balance of bargaining power in family care decisions. This, in turn, leads
to a location equilibrium in which both ﬁrstborn and second-born siblings have a strategic
incentive to move away from their parents. Second, if parents need a given amount of
care, two siblings may ﬁnd ways of sharing the responsibility, whereas an only child has
to provide the whole amount. As a consequence, locating close to parents is more salient
for the only child than for each of the siblings. Lastly, the cost of moving away from
parents may be higher for only children than for children with siblings. For example, it
is conceivable that siblings who move to the same area can still get together and tap into
each other’s social networks, reducing the cost of integration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section describes the
data we use and provides some institutional background to elderly care in European
countries. Section three presents the empirical results. Section four oﬀers some concluding
comments.
II. Data
Our main analysis is based on data drawn from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retire-
ment in Europe (SHARE). This cross-national database provides micro data on health,
socio-economic status and the social and family networks of individuals aged 50 or over.
Our estimation sample is based on data contributed by ten countries. They are a balanced
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mark) through Central Europe (Austria, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands) to
the Mediterranean (Spain, Italy, Greece).1 For our purposes, SHARE has three advan-
tages. First, it collects detailed information on child-parent geographic proximity and
socioeconomic characteristics for both generations. Second, it allows us to examine the
determinants of geographical distances to parents across countries with large cultural,
historical and political diﬀerences. Third, it not only helps us understand family location
patterns, but also the extent to which time transfers to elderly parents are consistent with
those location patterns.
We restrict our sample to parents with one or two biological children who are still
alive at the time of the interview. We also require that all children are 30 years of
age or older. On average, adult children are 42 years old, 65 percent are married, and
slightly more than 70 percent of them have children themselves. Similar to the data set
used by Konrad et al. (2002), children’s socioeconomic characteristics and child-parent
geographic distance are reported by the parent. The mean age of parents is 70 years, 60
percent of respondents are female and 15 percent report to have severely limiting health
conditions. Overall, the sample consists of 9,707 adult children, 23 percent of whom are
only children. A description of all variables used in the analysis, as well as summary
statistics, are provided in the appendix.
To examine the location choices of adult children, we distinguish between the following
ﬁve child-parent geographic distance categories: in the same house or household, less than
1 kilometre away, 1 to 5 kilometres away, 5 to 100 kilometres away, and more than 100
kilometres away. Overall, around 14 percent of adult children live in the same house or
household as their elderly parents and 16 percent live more than 100 kilometres away
from their parents’ residence.
To analyze time allocations to elderly parents, we use two outcome variables. The
ﬁrst, Help to Parents, is a binary variable which equals one for children who have provided
help to their parents in the twelve months prior to the interview. Services provided may
include personal care (e.g., assistance with dressing, bathing, eating), practical household
help (e.g., home repairs, gardening, shopping) and help with paperwork (e.g., completing
forms, settling ﬁnancial matters). The second, Frequency of Help, is a categorial variable
1This paper uses release 2.0.1 of the SHARE 2004 wave. The original SHARE data covers 12 countries.
We decided not to report results for Switzerland because of relatively small sample sizes. Moreover, to
guarantee a certain degree of homogeneity along economic, social and political dimensions, we excluded
Israel from the analysis. Robustness checks indicated that the inclusion of these two countries does not
alter our key results. For further information about SHARE see B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2005) and references
therein.
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almost daily, almost every week, almost every month, or less frequently.
Finally, we also made it our aim to investigate whether family location and caregiving
patterns are shaped by cross-country diﬀerences in institutional features of elderly care
systems. We, therefore, divide countries into three broad categories according to the
extent of family obligations, legal requirements and public sector provision of elderly care
(Miller and Warman, 1996). In the ﬁrst category we sort autonomy countries. These are
countries where family members have no legal obligation to provide or pay for elderly care.
At the same time, the care responsibilities of the state are well deﬁned and explicit. In
Sweden, for example, the 1956 Municipality Social Services Act assigns local authorities
the primary responsibility for elderly care. In our sample, the two countries that fall in
this category are Denmark and Sweden. The second category is comprised of nuclear
family countries. Here, family obligations are mainly deﬁned as being based on the
nuclear family, i.e., obligations between partners and between parents and children. In
nuclear family countries, adult children have legal maintenance obligations towards their
parents. In our sample, the countries that fall in this category are Austria, Belgium,
France, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Finally, the third category is made
up of extended family countries. In these countries, extended families play an important
role in providing intra-family support. This includes legal obligations between family
members to provide ﬁnancial support to each other and these obligations are embedded
into a broader family context, including grandparents, uncles and aunts. In our sample,
the two countries that fall into this category are Italy and Spain.
III. Results
A. Family Location Patterns
As noted above, the term “geography of the family” was coined to suggest that the
main location pattern in families is characterized by asymmetric behavior of siblings,
with ﬁrstborn children consistently locating further away from their parents than second-
born or only children (Konrad et al., 2002). However, it would also make theoretical
sense to argue that what matters more than birth order is the very presence of a sibling.
First, the strategic inﬂuence of siblings on one another in the choice of locations may
override the strategic inﬂuence of ﬁrstborn on second-born siblings (Rainer and Siedler,
2009). Second, being an only child may necessitate shorter distances to parents since
there are no other siblings who could help in if required. Conversely, having a sibling may
allow the responsibility of caregiving to be shared between two people, possibly decreasing
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from parents may be higher for only children than for children with siblings. For example,
siblings who move to the same area can still socialize with and support each other.
We now attempt to shed light on these contradictory views by estimating ordinal lo-
gistic regressions for child-parent geographic distance. The results are reported in Table
1. The ﬁrst column reports estimated coeﬃcients from a pooled regression for all ten
countries, and the remaining columns display the results for each country separately. Be-
sides controlling for socioeconomic background variables, the pooled country regression
also includes country dummy variables to capture country ﬁxed eﬀects on adult children’s
location decisions. To test for the presence of asymmetry in the location choice of ﬁrst-
born and second-born siblings, we also report p-values from chi-square equality tests at
the bottom of the table. The underlying null hypothesis here is that the estimated coef-
ﬁcients of being a ﬁrstborn and second-born on child-parent geographic distance are not
statistically diﬀerent from each other.
The main coeﬃcients of interest are those on being a ﬁrstborn and a second-born
sibling, respectively. Overall, having a sibling appears to have a profound impact on
adult children’s location decisions. There is, however, no evidence to relate birth order
to asymmetric location choices of siblings. To see this, consider, ﬁrst, the results from
our pooled multi-country regression [column (1)]. The estimated coeﬃcients suggest that
both ﬁrstborn and second-born siblings are signiﬁcantly more likely to live further away
from their elderly parents than only children. The estimates are not only statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level; the corresponding marginal eﬀects lead one to believe
that they are also quantitatively important. For example, ﬁrstborns have a 5 percentage
point and second-born siblings a 4 percentage point higher probability of living more than
100 kilometres away from their parents than only children. Finally, there is no signiﬁcant
asymmetry in the location choice of ﬁrstborn and second-born siblings. Indeed, the p-
value of 0.31 reported at the bottom of the table indicates that the coeﬃcients for ﬁrst
and second-born siblings are not statistically diﬀerent from one another.
Moving on to individual country results [columns (2) to (11)], the family location
pattern observed in the aggregate is borne out with a striking degree of consistency. The
estimates for Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria, Greece and Belgium indicate that children
with a sibling live, on average, further away from their parents than only children.2 While
the presence of a sibling appears to play an important role for adult children’s location
choices, there is a lack of a birth order eﬀect since the coeﬃcients for ﬁrstborn and
2Note, however, that the coeﬃcient of being a ﬁrstborn sibling in Germany is not precisely estimated.
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only coeﬃcients the magnitude of which are in line with the idea that siblings behave
asymmetrically (as suggested by Konrad et al. (2002)) are those for Sweden. However,
these estimates lack precision and are not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Overall, the empirical results so far serve to breathe life into the model’s prediction by
Rainer and Siedler (2009) that the presence of a sibling is more important for family
location patterns than birth order.
As emphasized in Section 2, there are considerable cross-country diﬀerences in the
institutional features of elderly care systems across Europe. We now investigate whether
these diﬀerences in family obligations and legal requirements are mirrored by adult chil-
dren’s location decisions. Table 2 reports estimates of ordered logistic regressions for
child-parent geographic distance separately for the three country regimes. Results re-
ported in the ﬁrst column are from a pooled regression for the sample of extended family
countries. It includes individuals resident in Italy and Spain, countries where the family
plays an important role in providing intra-family support, where family ties are strong
and where the family − rather than the market or the public sector − provides goods and
services to other family members (Giuliano, 2007). The second column reports pooled
regression estimates for nuclear family countries, in which family obligations are mainly
deﬁned as being between partners and between parents and children. The last column in
Table 2 presents estimates for the autonomy countries Denmark and Sweden, where there
are no legal obligations for adult children to pay for or to provide elderly care and where
the responsibility of the state is well deﬁned. Looking at the main coeﬃcients of being
a ﬁrstborn and second-born sibling reveals striking diﬀerences across the three country
regimes. The presence of a sibling plays the most important role for adult children living
in extended family countries. Indeed, the coeﬃcients of being a ﬁrstborn and second-born
sibling in column 1 of Table 2 are highly signiﬁcant and quantitatively important. For
example, the coeﬃcient of 0.346 for being a ﬁrstborn implies that ﬁrstborn siblings have
a 6 percentage point higher likelihood of living more than 100 kilometres away from their
parents than only children. The corresponding marginal eﬀect for second-born siblings
is 5 percentage points. These are sizeable eﬀects given that only around 10 percent of
adult children in Italy and Spain live more than 100 kilometres away from their parents’
residence. Similarly, in the sample of nuclear family countries, adult children with a sib-
ling live, on average, further away from their parents than only children. Note, however,
that the estimates are smaller in magnitude than the corresponding ones in column 1.
The last column in Table 2 shows that − in autonomy countries − there is no signiﬁ-
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distance. The magnitude of these coeﬃcients is very small and they are not statistically
diﬀerent from zero. Indeed, the corresponding marginal eﬀects are all very close to zero,
indicating that family structure is of no importance for adult children’s location decisions
in countries where the public sector has explicit responsibilities for elderly care. Overall,
the estimates in Table 2 provide robust support for the implication that the presence of
a sibling plays a more important role in countries where elderly care is the responsibility
of the family rather than the state.
Next, we investigate whether the location behavior of adult children varies depending
on the birth order and sibship sex composition. Similar to Konrad et al. (2002), we dis-
tinguish between nine diﬀerent child-type dummy variables: male siblings with a younger
brother, male siblings with a younger sister, female siblings with a younger brother, female
siblings with a younger sister, male siblings with an older brother, male siblings with an
older sister, female siblings with an older brother, female siblings with an older sister, and
only children. For convenience, we also call ﬁrstborns Alice and Adam, and second-born
children Betty and Benjamin. Table 3 reports the estimates of the various child-type
dummies on child-parent geographic distance. As in previous regressions, being an only
child serves as the reference category. The ﬁrst column in Table 3 presents the coeﬃcient
estimates from the pooled multi-country regression. All eight child-type estimates are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. In terms of the magnitude
of the eﬀects, these estimates indicate, for example, that being a male ﬁrstborn from a
family with two sons (Adam of Adam-Benjamin) reduces the probability of living in the
same house or household as the parents by four percentage points as compared to being
an only child. Similarly, the corresponding marginal eﬀect for a female ﬁrstborn from a
family with two daughters (Alice of Alice-Betty) is also four percentage points. Hence, we
again ﬁnd support for our conjecture that the presence of a sibling is important for adult
children’s location choices irrespective of siblings’ gender and sibship sex composition.
The estimates in columns (2) to (4) in Table 3 provide additional support for our
hypothesis that the interplay between adult children’s location decisions and family struc-
ture is shaped by institutional features. First, note that the majority of the estimated
coeﬃcients of child-type variables in column 2 of Table 3 are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, and all estimates are considerably larger in magnitude than the corresponding
ones in columns (3) and (4), respectively. Second, consistent with the results presented
earlier, the coeﬃcients on the various child type variables in the sample of nuclear family
countries suggest that adult children with a sibling are signiﬁcantly more likely to live
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daughters, for both ﬁrstborn and second-born siblings and also holds independent of the
presence of a brother or sister. Finally, again we do not ﬁnd a strong relationship between
family structure and child-parent geographic distance in the sample of autonomy coun-
tries−while most of the coeﬃcient estimates for child-types are positive, none of them is
statistically signiﬁcant. Taken as a whole, the results provide evidence that birth order
and sibling sex composition do not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on adult children’s location
decisions, whereas the presence of a sibling matters for adult children’s location decisions
in countries where elderly care is mainly the responsibility of the family.
B. Patterns of Time Transfers to Elderly Parents
Our results so far show that, irrespective of birth order, children with a sibling system-
atically locate further away from their parents than only children. It is, therefore, not
unreasonable to expect that the presence of both an older sibling or a younger sibling
also reduces the time a particular child allocates to his or her parents. For instance,
Ermisch (2009) reports a negative relationship between child-parent geographic distance
and the likelihood that elderly parents receive regular or frequent in-kind help from their
adult children. If, by contrast, older siblings can induce younger siblings to become the
sole caregivers (` a la Konrad et al., 2002), then the presence of a younger sibling would
be negatively correlated with ﬁrstborn siblings’ time transfers; conversely, second-born
children’s time allocation would be unaﬀected by the presence of an older sibling.
In an eﬀort to understand the role of siblings in caring for elderly parents, we now turn
to time transfers in the data. To this end, Table 4 presents estimates of the determinants
of child-to-parent time allocations. Panel (a) reports the estimates as to whether adult
children have provided any kind of help to their parents, and panel (b) displays the re-
sults for the frequency of help to elderly parents. Of primary importance are our ﬁndings
concerning the eﬀects of having a sibling. Overall, we ﬁnd that time transfers to elderly
parents respond negatively to the presence of a sibling. More speciﬁcally, the results in
panel (a), column 1 indicate that having a sibling reduces the probability of a particular
child providing any kind of help to his or her parents. As well as being statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 1 percent level, this result is also quantitatively important. The corresponding
marginal eﬀects from the pooled regression suggest that being a ﬁrstborn or second-born
sibling reduces the probability of providing help to parents by 4 percentage points, com-
pared to being an only child. In line with our theory, the estimates suggest that the
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moving on to the individual country estimates reveal that both ﬁrstborn and second-born
siblings are less likely to provide help to their parents than only children in all but one
country (Belgium). The estimates in panel (b) show that children with a sibling provide
less frequent help to their parents than only children. Non-reported marginal eﬀects for
the pooled cross-country estimates show, for example, that both types of siblings are 1 to
2 percentage points less likely to help their parent every week, compared to an only child.
The previous section demonstrated that, on average, adult siblings in nuclear family
countries and autonomy countries locate further away from their parents’ residence than
only children. We now examine whether the institutional diﬀerences in the elderly care
systems across European countries also have an impact on adult children’s time transfers
and support to ageing parents. The results are shown in Table 5. The ﬁrst three columns
present estimates for whether adult children have provided any kind of help to their
parents, and the remaining columns present estimated coeﬃcients for the frequency of
help to elderly parents. There are several key ﬁndings: ﬁrst, time transfers to parents
respond negatively to the presence of a sibling in all six regressions, and the coeﬃcients are
always very precisely estimated and quantitatively important. For example, the estimated
coeﬃcients of being a ﬁrstborn (-1.008) and second-born (-0.943) in column 1 of Table 5
imply that siblings are 3 percentage points less likely to have provided help to their parents
compared to only children. Second, consistent with children’s location decisions, family
structure is most strongly associated with time transfers to parents in extended family
countries. However, distinct from the pattern we observed for adult children’s location
decisions, the estimates in Table 5 do not suggest that children in extended family countries
provide more help to their parents than those in nuclear family countries.
In Table 6 we present estimates for the eight diﬀerent child-types as to whether adult
children have provided any kind of help to their elderly parents. Consistent with the
previous results on child-parent geographic distance, the estimated coeﬃcients in column
1 of Table 6 suggest that − independent of children’s gender and sibling sex composition
− both ﬁrstborn and second-born children are less likely to provide help to their elderly
parents than only children. In other words, both ﬁrstborn male and ﬁrstborn female
siblings, as well as second-born male and second-born female siblings are less likely to have
helped their parents during the last year than only children. Moving on to the separate
regime-type regressions shows that the negative relationship between family structure and
3While the p-value for the presence of asymmetry in providing help to parents for ﬁrstborn and second-
born siblings shows a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence among siblings, the corresponding marginal eﬀects
do not point to important quantitative diﬀerences.
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extended family countries. Note, for example, that four out of six estimated coeﬃcients
on child-types in column 2 of Table 6 are larger in magnitude than the corresponding
ones in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. Finally, the estimates on the frequency of help to
elderly parents reported in Table 7 conﬁrm these results.
It is worth emphasizing that the results just described hold both for ﬁrst and second-
born siblings. In other words, birth order does not have a discernible impact on time
transfers to elderly parents. This result resonates with our earlier ﬁndings concerning
family location patterns. In particular, we have already empirically shown that the pres-
ence of an older sibling does not imply that younger siblings stay closer to their parents.
In line with this lack of birth order eﬀect, we have now observed that second-born children
do not consistently assume the entire burden of making time transfers to their parents.
These ﬁndings are important, as they suggest that there is no systematic asymmetry in
the behavior of siblings. Rather, the results provide convincing evidence that the pres-
ence of a sibling matters, independent of birth order position, children’s gender as well
as siblings sex composition. Particularly persuasive, here, is the consistency of location
and contribution patterns in families with one and two children across a wide range of
countries.
IV. Conclusions
The graying of populations is a growing concern worldwide, and policymakers around the
globe place increasing pressure on families to provide care for the elderly. Families, and
adult children, in particular, provide care to the elderly in a variety of ways. Some families
do this via a network where more than one sibling takes responsibility for elderly parents.
In other families, one adult child is the sole provider of care. Whether adult children form
networks or one sibling provides the bulk of the care, conﬂict between siblings is a likely
result of ﬁlial care.4 One frequently cited factor determining potential care contributions
is the geographic proximity between caregivers and care recipients. This latter point
means that the location decisions of parents and adult children are likely to be crucial
for how sibling conﬂicts over caregiving are played out. It, therefore, makes theoretical
sense to believe that the location and caregiving choices of adult children are intertwined
decisions.
Against this background, we have carried out a cross-national empirical analysis of
4Sociological research suggests that nearly 40 percent of adult children providing care experienced
serious conﬂict with a sibling, usually due to insuﬃcient help.
12intra-family location and caregiving patterns. With this, we have made a contribution to
the enrichment of our understanding of the geography of the family. We have also engaged
with the question as to how family-related and institutional factors shape patterns of
time transfers from adult children to elderly parents. The single most inﬂuential family-
related factor determining intra-family location and caregiving patterns is the presence of
a sibling, but only in countries where adult children have legal maintenance responsibilities
towards their parents. Conversely, in countries where the elderly care responsibilities of
the public sector are well deﬁned and explicit, family structure has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the location and caregiving choices of adult children. While children with siblings appear
to behave intrinsically diﬀerently than only children, we ﬁnd no evidence that birth order
or the gender composition of sibships have a discernible eﬀect on family location and
caregiving patterns. In the next phase of empirical and theoretical research in this area,
it will be interesting to see whether the geography of the family also has consequences for
partnership formation decisions of adult children and their labor market outcomes.
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13Table 1: Child-Parent Distance Regressions for Three Child Types
All Italy Spain Germany France Austria Greece Belgium Nether- Sweden Denmark
countries lands
Child
Age 0.013** 0.022* 0.016+ 0.011 0.018+ 0.016 0.016* 0.013 0.023* -0.007 0.016
(0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Female -0.010 0.146* -0.212** 0.074 -0.051 0.015 -0.073 -0.022 -0.003 0.005 -0.104
(0.022) (0.071) (0.082) (0.067) (0.073) (0.074) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) (0.091)
Married 0.267** 0.505** 0.478** 0.248** 0.281** 0.039 0.688** 0.122+ 0.200* 0.168* 0.004
(0.027) (0.101) (0.150) (0.079) (0.088) (0.087) (0.109) (0.073) (0.083) (0.068) (0.107)
Grandchildren 0.035 -0.009 0.410** -0.096 -0.081 -0.016 -0.133 0.361** 0.131 -0.220* -0.006
(0.030) (0.094) (0.139) (0.086) (0.107) (0.093) (0.113) (0.086) (0.088) (0.098) (0.130)
Firstborn 0.200** 0.392** 0.261* 0.085 0.116 0.414** 0.183* 0.252** -0.001 0.115 0.065
(0.029) (0.097) (0.112) (0.083) (0.094) (0.094) (0.092) (0.080) (0.106) (0.093) (0.145)
Second-born 0.175** 0.343** 0.211+ 0.161+ 0.119 0.348** 0.199* 0.169* 0.055 0.011 0.054
(0.030) (0.101) (0.118) (0.085) (0.095) (0.104) (0.094) (0.082) (0.104) (0.094) (0.135)
Parent
Age -0.010** -0.014 -0.020* -0.003 -0.019* -0.020* -0.009 -0.018* -0.014+ 0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013)
Female -0.089** -0.231* -0.056 -0.160* -0.064 -0.250** -0.107 -0.088 0.000 -0.050 0.024
(0.026) (0.091) (0.107) (0.075) (0.089) (0.093) (0.085) (0.075) (0.080) (0.072) (0.114)
Married -0.000 -0.114 0.243* 0.000 0.075 -0.088 0.062 -0.214** 0.021 -0.046 0.035
(0.028) (0.092) (0.107) (0.084) (0.086) (0.092) (0.084) (0.081) (0.087) (0.077) (0.109)
Limited activities 0.015 -0.139 0.051 -0.013 -0.036 0.174+ 0.114 -0.089 0.233** -0.003 -0.072
(0.027) (0.089) (0.097) (0.076) (0.092) (0.089) (0.078) (0.076) (0.085) (0.077) (0.108)
Severely
limited activities -0.042 -0.073 -0.012 -0.076 -0.267* 0.079 0.198+ -0.339** 0.143 0.083 -0.183
(0.035) (0.108) (0.210) (0.098) (0.117) (0.124) (0.117) (0.089) (0.102) (0.100) (0.152)
P-value of equality testa 0.31 0.56 0.56 0.32 0.97 0.43 0.80 0.29 0.49 0.15 0.92
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.02
Observations 9,707 966 735 1,114 920 869 1,173 1,217 962 1,151 600
Notes: The dependent variable is child-parent geographic distance. The reference categories for non-scaled variables are male, not married, no
grandchildren, being an only child, male parent, unmarried parent, and parent has not been limited for the past six month because of a health
problem in usual daily activities. Robust standard errors at the family level in parentheses. All regressions also control for a maximum set of highest
educational degree variables for adult children and parents. The regression in column 1 also includes a maximum set of country dummy variables. a
Figures are p-values of the test that the estimated coeﬃcients of being ﬁrstborn and second-born are equal and are obtained from χ2-statistics. +
signiﬁcant at 10 percent, * signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.Table 2: Institutional Heterogeneity in Child-Parent Distance Regressions
Extended Family Nuclear Family Autonomy
Countries Countries Countries
Child
Age 0.018* 0.014** 0.002
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Female -0.002 -0.008 -0.024
(0.053) (0.027) (0.053)
Married 0.511** 0.245** 0.118*
(0.083) (0.033) (0.057)
Grandchildren 0.148+ 0.040 -0.160*
(0.077) (0.037) (0.077)
Firstborn 0.346** 0.182** 0.105
(0.072) (0.036) (0.078)
Second-born 0.286** 0.179** 0.033
(0.075) (0.037) (0.076)
Age -0.016* -0.011** 0.002
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Female -0.146* -0.092** -0.028
(0.068) (0.033) (0.060)
Married 0.032 -0.004 -0.024
(0.070) (0.035) (0.063)
Limited activities -0.041 0.049 -0.033
(0.065) (0.033) (0.062)
Severely limited activities -0.006 -0.051 -0.000
(0.096) (0.042) (0.084)
P-value of equality testa 0.31 0.92 0.22
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.01
Observations 1,701 6,255 1,751
Notes: The dependent variable is child-parent geographic distance. Extended fam-
ily countries: Italy and Spain. Nuclear family countries: Germany, France, Austria,
Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands. Autonomy countries: Sweden and Denmark.
The reference categories for non-scaled variables are male, not married, no grandchil-
dren, being an only child, male parent, unmarried parent, and parent has not been
limited for the past six month because of a health problem in usual daily activities.
Robust standard errors at the family level in parentheses. All regressions also con-
trol for a maximum set of highest educational degree variables for adult children and
parents, and also include a maximum set of country dummy variables. a Figures are
p-values of the test that the estimated coeﬃcients of being ﬁrstborn and second-born
are equal and are obtained from χ2-statistics. + signiﬁcant at 10 percent, * signiﬁcant
at 5 percent, ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.Table 3: Sibship Sex Composition in Child-Parent Distance Regressions
All Countries Extended Family Nuclear Family Autonomy
Countries Countries Countries
Child
Age 0.013** 0.017* 0.014** 0.002
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Female 0.024 0.217+ -0.036 -0.011
(0.047) (0.121) (0.056) (0.128)
Married 0.267** 0.503** 0.245** 0.122*
(0.027) (0.084) (0.033) (0.057)
Grandchildren 0.034 0.154* 0.039 -0.164*
(0.030) (0.076) (0.037) (0.077)
Adam of Adam-Benjamin 0.220** 0.497** 0.176** 0.041
(0.051) (0.128) (0.061) (0.130)
Adam of Adam-Betty 0.259** 0.535** 0.177** 0.202
(0.048) (0.117) (0.059) (0.125)
Alice of Alice-Betty 0.199** 0.291** 0.224** 0.053
(0.048) (0.113) (0.059) (0.123)
Alice of Alice-Benjamin 0.129** 0.092 0.157** 0.104
(0.045) (0.112) (0.056) (0.114)
Benjamin of Adam-Benjamin 0.185** 0.353** 0.178** 0.015
(0.051) (0.125) (0.063) (0.128)
Betty of Adam-Betty 0.151** 0.128 0.214** -0.027
(0.047) (0.112) (0.059) (0.113)
Betty of Alice-Betty 0.197** 0.259* 0.207** 0.141
(0.049) (0.120) (0.060) (0.119)
Benjamin of Alice-Benjamin 0.173** 0.466** 0.120* 0.029
(0.048) (0.126) (0.059) (0.125)
Parent
Age -0.010** -0.015* -0.011** 0.002
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Female -0.088** -0.141* -0.091** -0.027
(0.026) (0.069) (0.033) (0.060)
Married -0.000 0.037 -0.004 -0.024
(0.028) (0.070) (0.035) (0.063)
Limited activities 0.016 -0.036 0.050 -0.031
(0.027) (0.065) (0.033) (0.062)
Severely limited activities -0.041 -0.009 -0.050 0.004
(0.035) (0.096) (0.042) (0.084)
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.01
Observations 9,707 1,701 6,255 1,751
Notes: The dependent variable is child-parent geographic distance. Extended family countries: Italy and
Spain. Nuclear family countries: Germany, France, Austria, Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands. Au-
tonomy countries: Sweden and Denmark. The reference categories for non-scaled variables are male, not
married, no grandchildren, being an only child, male parent, unmarried parent, and parent has not been
limited for the past six month because of a health problem in usual daily activities. Robust standard errors
at the family level in parentheses. All regressions also control for a maximum set of highest educational
degree variables for adult children and parents, and also include a maximum set of country dummy variables.
+ signiﬁcant at 10 percent, * signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.Table 4: Child-to-Parent Time Regressions for Three Child Types
All Italy Spain Germany France Austria Greece Belgium Nether- Sweden Denmark
countries lands
A. Help to parents
Firstborn -0.544** -0.966** -1.057** -0.369* -0.676** -0.739** -0.400* -0.474* -0.787** -0.754** -0.443*
(0.060) (0.247) (0.276) (0.144) (0.228) (0.194) (0.168) (0.185) (0.245) (0.180) (0.217)
Second-born -0.481** -0.926** -0.941** -0.354* -0.522* -0.558** -0.394* -0.298 -0.729** -0.632** -0.488*
(0.062) (0.274) (0.278) (0.149) (0.244) (0.177) (0.173) (0.205) (0.233) (0.182) (0.226)
P-value of equality testa 0.02 0.76 0.28 0.82 0.12 0.03 0.92 0.05 0.60 0.15 0.64
Pseudo R2 0.219 0.246 0.329 0.140 0.414 0.221 0.191 0.275 0.247 0.292 0.122
B. Frequency of help
Firstborn -0.523** -1.000** -0.970** -0.320* -0.578* -0.729** -0.318* -0.520** -0.777** -0.739** -0.444*
(0.058) (0.249) (0.277) (0.137) (0.225) (0.181) (0.159) (0.177) (0.245) (0.164) (0.199)
Second-born -0.463** -1.009** -0.824** -0.334* -0.477* -0.589** -0.313+ -0.297 -0.744** -0.559** -0.440*
(0.059) (0.269) (0.272) (0.136) (0.235) (0.172) (0.160) (0.194) (0.225) (0.173) (0.221)
P-value of equality testa 0.02 0.95 0.25 0.85 0.25 0.09 0.94 0.01 0.74 0.06 0.97
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.22 0.24 0.11 0.31 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.10
Observations 6,741 591 460 795 729 597 693 826 731 887 432
Notes: In Panel A the dependent variable is whether adult children have provided any kind of help to their parents in the last twelve months. In
Panel B the dependent variable is the frequency of help to parents (ﬁve categories). Panel A reports estimates from probit regressions and Panel B
reports estimates from ordered probit regressions. Non-reported explanatory variables as in Table 2, except of highest educational degree variables for
adult children and parents in the country speciﬁc regressions due to collinearity problems. Robust standard errors at the family level in parentheses.
a Figures are p-values of the test that the estimated coeﬃcients of being ﬁrstborn and second-born are equal and are obtained from χ2-statistics. +
signiﬁcant at 10 percent, * signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.Table 5: Institutional Heterogeneity in Child-to-Parent Time Regressions
Help to parents Frequency of help
Extended Nuclear Autonomy Extended Nuclear Autonomy
Family Family Countries Family Family Countries
Countries Countries Countries Countries
Child
Age 0.006 0.016* 0.013 0.000 0.016* 0.018
(0.019) (0.008) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014)
Female 0.012 0.201** -0.271** 0.081 0.237** -0.194*
(0.180) (0.059) (0.100) (0.188) (0.055) (0.094)
Married 0.393 -0.133+ -0.088 0.399 -0.135* -0.065
(0.313) (0.072) (0.127) (0.296) (0.068) (0.115)
Grandchildren 0.200 0.055 -0.031 0.188 0.035 -0.068
(0.286) (0.081) (0.144) (0.274) (0.079) (0.135)
Firstborn -1.008** -0.479** -0.643** -0.960** -0.453** -0.657**
(0.200) (0.072) (0.140) (0.205) (0.069) (0.127)
Second-born -0.943** -0.421** -0.599** -0.906** -0.410** -0.554**
(0.210) (0.074) (0.140) (0.210) (0.071) (0.134)
Parent
Age 0.027 0.014+ 0.021 0.030+ 0.015* 0.017
(0.018) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018) (0.007) (0.012)
Female 0.766** 0.044 0.602** 0.729* 0.064 0.553**
(0.276) (0.086) (0.156) (0.295) (0.081) (0.155)
Married 0.020 -0.569** -0.352* -0.015 -0.554** -0.323*
(0.216) (0.083) (0.146) (0.214) (0.079) (0.141)
Limited activities 0.232 0.404** 0.162 0.286 0.410** 0.160
(0.220) (0.085) (0.152) (0.213) (0.082) (0.143)
Severely
limited activities 0.870** 0.814** 0.556** 0.884** 0.842** 0.638**
(0.284) (0.100) (0.196) (0.262) (0.096) (0.189)
P-value of equality testa 0.41 0.06 0.50 0.54 0.16 0.13
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.17
Observations 1,051 4,371 1,319 1,051 4,371 1,319
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) report estimates from probit regressions, columns (4)-(6) report estimates from
ordered probit regressions. Extended family countries: Italy and Spain. Nuclear family countries: Austria,
Belgium, Greece, France and the Netherlands. Autonomy countries: Denmark and Sweden. The reference
categories for non-scaled variables are male, not married, no grandchildren, being an only child, male parent,
unmarried parent, and parent has not been limited for the past six month because of a health problem in
usual daily activities. Robust standard errors at the family level in parentheses. All regressions also control
for a maximum set of highest educational degree variables for adult children and parents. a Figures are
p-values of the test that the estimated coeﬃcients of being ﬁrstborn and second-born are equal and are
obtained from χ2-statistics. + signiﬁcant at 10 percent, * signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent
level.Table 6: Sibship Sex Composition in Child-to-Parent Time Regressions (Help to Parents)
All Countries Extended Family Nuclear Family Autonomy
Countries Countries Countries
Child
Age 0.016* 0.006 0.017* 0.012
(0.007) (0.018) (0.008) (0.014)
Female 0.039 0.250 0.115 -0.398+
(0.079) (0.236) (0.094) (0.206)
Married -0.100 0.463 -0.137+ -0.088
(0.061) (0.312) (0.072) (0.129)
Grandchildren 0.039 0.210 0.045 -0.038
(0.068) (0.283) (0.081) (0.147)
Adam of Adam-Benjamin -0.624** -0.539 -0.644** -0.824**
(0.115) (0.340) (0.146) (0.229)
Adam of Adam-Betty -0.489** -0.712* -0.396** -0.751**
(0.100) (0.316) (0.121) (0.222)
Alice of Alice-Betty -0.419** -1.084** -0.232* -1.171**
(0.099) (0.329) (0.114) (0.304)
Alice of Alice-Benjamin -0.677** -0.751** -0.148
(0.105) (0.134) (0.223)
Benjamin of Adam-Benjamin -0.559** -0.458 -0.578** -0.783**
(0.115) (0.341) (0.146) (0.223)
Betty of Adam-Betty -0.472** -0.915** -0.458** -0.321
(0.100) (0.315) (0.120) (0.236)
Betty of Alice-Betty -0.358** -1.005** -0.172 -1.114**
(0.100) (0.343) (0.115) (0.298)
Benjamin of Alice-Benjamin -0.559** -0.562** -0.496*
(0.108) (0.136) (0.215)
Parent
Age 0.015* 0.029 0.013+ 0.024+
(0.006) (0.019) (0.008) (0.013)
Female 0.215** 0.813** 0.039 0.639**
(0.072) (0.263) (0.087) (0.158)
Married -0.456** -0.046 -0.568** -0.356*
(0.069) (0.215) (0.084) (0.146)
Limited activities 0.339** 0.277 0.414** 0.160
(0.070) (0.221) (0.086) (0.153)
Severely
limited activities 0.754** 0.935** 0.828** 0.547**
(0.084) (0.290) (0.100) (0.195)
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.25
Observations 6,741 869 4,371 1,319
Notes: The dependent variable is help to parents. Estimates from probit regressions. Extended family
countries: Italy and Spain. Nuclear family countries: Germany, France, Austria, Greece, Belgium and the
Netherlands. Autonomy countries: Sweden and Denmark. The reference categories for non-scaled variables
are male, not married, no grandchildren, being an only child, male parent, unmarried parent, and parent
has not been limited for the past six month because of a health problem in usual daily activities. Robust
standard errors at the family level in parentheses. All regressions also control for a maximum set of highest
educational degree variables for adult children and parents. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 also include a
maximum set of country dummy variables. In the extended family countries two child type coeﬃcients and
182 observations are dropped from the regression because they predict failure perfectly. + signiﬁcant at 10
percent, * signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.Table 7: Sibship Sex Composition in Child-to-Parent Time Regressions (Frequency of Help)
All Countries Extended Family Nuclear Family Autonomy
Countries Countries Countries
Child
Age 0.016* -0.004 0.016* 0.016
(0.006) (0.018) (0.008) (0.014)
Female 0.118 0.354 0.177* -0.233
(0.074) (0.231) (0.088) (0.190)
Married -0.099+ 0.417 -0.138* -0.059
(0.057) (0.308) (0.068) (0.118)
Grandchildren 0.029 0.211 0.027 -0.073
(0.066) (0.284) (0.078) (0.137)
Adam of Adam-Benjamin -0.589** -0.435 -0.632** -0.779**
(0.110) (0.350) (0.139) (0.209)
Adam of Adam-Betty -0.420** -0.709* -0.323** -0.680**
(0.096) (0.313) (0.116) (0.208)
Alice of Alice-Betty -0.421** -1.153** -0.238* -1.258**
(0.095) (0.368) (0.108) (0.287)
Alice of Alice-Benjamin -0.697** -0.740** -0.264
(0.103) (0.133) (0.207)
Benjamin of Adam-Benjamin -0.527** -0.456 -0.564** -0.706**
(0.111) (0.344) (0.140) (0.215)
Betty of Adam-Betty -0.425** -0.921** -0.399** -0.313
(0.099) (0.326) (0.118) (0.237)
Betty of Alice-Betty -0.408** -1.117** -0.238* -1.156**
(0.095) (0.383) (0.108) (0.297)
Benjamin of Alice-Benjamin -0.519** -0.528** -0.404*
(0.103) (0.131) (0.198)
Parent
Age 0.016** 0.035* 0.014+ 0.020
(0.006) (0.018) (0.007) (0.012)
Female 0.212** 0.786** 0.058 0.588**
(0.070) (0.286) (0.083) (0.157)
Married -0.444** -0.070 -0.551** -0.329*
(0.066) (0.211) (0.080) (0.141)
Limited activities 0.791** 0.908** 0.853** 0.636**
(0.080) (0.273) (0.096) (0.188)
Severely
limited activities 0.352** 0.273 0.419** 0.162
(0.068) (0.224) (0.083) (0.143)
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.22 0.18 0.19
Observations 6,741 869 4,371 1,319
Notes: The dependent variable is the frequency of help to parents (ﬁve categories). Estimates from ordered
probit regressions. Extended family countries: Italy and Spain. Nuclear Family Countries: Germany, France,
Austria, Greece, Belgium and the Netherlands. Autonomy countries: Sweden and Denmark. The reference
categories for non-scaled variables are male, not married, no grandchildren, being an only child, male parent,
unmarried parent, and parent has not been limited for the past six month because of a health problem in
usual daily activities. Robust standard errors at the family level in parentheses. All regressions also control
for a maximum set of highest educational degree variables for adult children and parents. Regressions in
columns 1 and 2 also include a maximum set of country dummy variables. In the extended family countries
two child type coeﬃcients and 182 observations are dropped from the regression because they predict failure
perfectly. + signiﬁcant at 10 percent, * signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent level.Appendix 1: Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables
All Italy Spain Germany France Austria Greece Belgium Nether- Sweden Denmark
countries lands
Child-parent geographic distance
Same house or household 0.136 0.331 0.240 0.151 0.059 0.165 0.261 0.081 0.027 0.015 0.023
Less than 1 kilometre away 0.151 0.135 0.284 0.120 0.109 0.130 0.183 0.172 0.162 0.115 0.108
1-5 kilometres away 0.192 0.177 0.181 0.176 0.153 0.177 0.159 0.234 0.269 0.205 0.168
5-100 kilometres away 0.356 0.265 0.191 0.346 0.404 0.357 0.239 0.446 0.415 0.411 0.500
More than 100 kilometres away 0.165 0.092 0.105 0.207 0.275 0.172 0.159 0.067 0.127 0.255 0.200
Number of observations 9,707 966 735 1,114 920 869 1,173 1,217 962 1,151 600
Time transfers to parents
Help to parents 0.093 0.032 0.057 0.158 0.080 0.122 0.144 0.081 0.041 0.083 0.125
(0.290) (0.177) (0.231) (0.365) (0.271) (0.328) (0.352) (0.273) (0.199) (0.277) (0.331)
Frequency of help
No help received 0.907 0.968 0.944 0.842 0.920 0.878 0.856 0.919 0.959 0.917 0.875
Less often than every month 0.020 0.000 0.004 0.031 0.010 0.021 0.025 0.012 0.020 0.029 0.044
Almost every month 0.021 0.012 0.009 0.035 0.015 0.027 0.035 0.012 0.006 0.024 0.039
Almost every week 0.037 0.012 0.015 0.070 0.032 0.055 0.059 0.040 0.011 0.026 0.037
Almost daily 0.015 0.009 0.028 0.021 0.023 0.018 0.026 0.017 0.004 0.005 0.005
Number of observations 6,741 591 460 795 729 597 693 826 731 887 432
Notes: Figures are means with standard deviations in parentheses.Appendix 2: Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables




Age 41.99 40.16 42.39 41.99 42.39 42.25 42.98 41.89 39.78 42.82 43.73
(8.32) (7.45) (8.38) (8.28) (8.55) (8.01) (8.24) (8.42) (7.48) (8.76) (8.91)
Female 0.500 0.502 0.488 0.505 0.505 0.524 0.480 0.500 0.490 0.517 0.495
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Married 0.645 0.654 0.737 0.630 0.635 0.613 0.765 0.646 0.647 0.517 0.613
(0.479) (0.476) (0.440) (0.483) (0.482) (0.487) (0.424) (0.478) (0.478) (0.499) (0.487)
Grandchildren 0.719 0.588 0.728 0.694 0.767 0.694 0.757 0.745 0.664 0.778 0.768
(0.450) (0.492) (0.445) (0.461) (0.422) (0.461) (0.429) (0.436) (0.472) (0.416) (0.422)
Firstborn 0.387 0.383 0.389 0.360 0.360 0.364 0.415 0.355 0.425 0.414 0.420
(0.487) (0.486) (0.487) (0.480) (0.480) (0.481) (0.493) (0.479) (0.495) (0.493) (0.494)
Second-born 0.387 0.383 0.389 0.360 0.360 0.364 0.415 0.355 0.425 0.414 0.420
(0.487) (0.486) (0.487) (0.480) (0.480) (0.481) (0.493) (0.479) (0.495) (0.493) (0.494)
Only child 0.225 0.234 0.222 0.282 0.280 0.273 0.170 0.290 0.150 0.171 0.160
(0.418) (0.424) (0.416) (0.450) (0.449) (0.446) (0.375) (0.454) (0.357) (0.377) (0.367)
Parent
Age 69.64 68.52 71.91 68.77 69.42 69.11 71.68 68.99 67.66 70.34 70.52
(8.99) (7.85) (8.90) (8.67) (9.21) (8.55) (8.94) (9.11) (8.92) (9.29) (9.62)
Female 0.593 0.611 0.641 0.591 0.622 0.612 0.646 0.500 0.536 0.586 0.620
(0.491) (0.488) (0.480) (0.492) (0.485) (0.487) (0.478) (0.500) (0.499) (0.493) (0.486)
Married 0.597 0.710 0.635 0.676 0.528 0.486 0.460 0.592 0.719 0.656 0.458
(0.490) (0.454) (0.482) (0.468) (0.499) (0.500) (0.499) (0.492) (0.499) (0.475) (0.499)
Limited because of a health problem
Not limited 0.527 0.555 0.503 0.431 0.577 0.489 0.549 0.556 0.554 0.540 0.505
(0.499) (0.497) (0.500) (0.496) (0.494) (0.500) (0.499) (0.497) (0.497) (0.499) (0.500)
Limited, but not severely 0.322 0.302 0.435 0.364 0.259 0.360 0.336 0.271 0.266 0.317 0.350
(0.467) (0.459) (0.496) (0.481) (0.440) (0.480) (0.473) (0.445) (0.442) (0.466) (0.477)
Severely limited 0.151 0.142 0.061 0.205 0.164 0.151 0.115 0.172 0.180 0.143 0.145
(0.358) (0.350) (0.240) (0.404) (0.371) (0.358) (0.319) (0.378) (0.384) (0.351) (0.352)
Number of observations 9,707 966 735 1,114 920 869 1,173 1,217 962 1,151 600
Notes: Figures are means with standard deviations in parentheses.Appendix 3: Description of Variables
Variable Question in SHARE reads: Variable in SHARE Deﬁnition of variable
Outcome Variables
Child-parent “Please look at card 5. Where Card 5: Variable has the following
geographic distance does [child name] live?” (1) In the same household; ﬁve distance categories:
(2) In the same building; (1) In the same building
(3) Less than 1 kilometre away; or household;
(4) Between 1 and 5 km away; (2) Less than 1 km away;
(5) Between 5 and 25 km away; (3) 1 to 5 km away;
(6) Between 25 and 100 km away; (4) 5-100 km away;
(7) Between 100 and 500 km away; (5) More than 100
(8) More than 500 km away; kilometres away.
(9) More than 500 km away in
another country.
Help to parents “Now please think of the last twelve (1) Yes; (5) No. Variable equals one if a
months. Has any family member respondent indicates (1)
from outside the household, any for a child, and zero
friend or neighbor given you [or] otherwise.
[your] [husband/wife/partner]
any kind of help?”
Frequency of help “In the last twelve months, how (1) Almost daily; Variable has the following
often altogether have you or (2) Almost every week; four help categories for
[or] [your] [husband/wife/partner] (3) Almost every month; a particular child:
received such help from this (4) Less often. (1) Almost daily;
person? Was it...” (2) Almost every week;
(3) Almost every month;




Age “In which year was [child name] Age of child (in years).
born?”
Female “Is [child name] male or female?” (1) Male; (2) Female. Variable equals one if a
Continued on next pagecontinued from previous page
Variables Question in SHARE reads: Variables in SHARE Deﬁnition of variable
respondent indicates (2)
for a child, and zero
otherwise.
Married “Please look at card 4. (1) Married and living together Variable equals one if a
What is the marital with spouse; (2) Registered respondent indicates (1)
status of [child name]?” partnership; (3) Married, living for a child, and zero
separated from spouse; (4) Never otherwise.
married; (5) Divorced;
(6) Widowed.
Grandchildren “How many children − Variable equals one if a
if any − does [child name] respondent indicates that
have?” child has any children, and
zero otherwise.
Highest school Please look at card 2. Card 2: Information is used to
leaving certiﬁcate What is the highest (1) Comprehensive school; generate a maximum
school leaving certiﬁcate (2) Grammar school; set of educational dummy
or school degree (3) Fee-paying grammar school; variables for each child.
[child name] has obtained? (4) Sixth form College/
Tertiary College




(8) Technical school (not college)
(95) No degree yet/still in school
(96) None
(97) Other type (also abroad).
Parent
Age “In which month and year Age of respondent
were you born?” (in years).
Continued on next pagecontinued from previous page
Variables Question in SHARE reads: Variables in SHARE Deﬁnition of variable
Female “What is your sex?” (1) Male; (2) Female. Variable equals one if
respondent indicates (2),
and zero otherwise.
Married “What is your marital status?” (1) Married and living together Variable equals one if a
with spouse; (2) Registered respondent indicates (1),
partnership; (3) Married, living and zero otherwise.
separated from spouse; (4) Never
married; (5) Divorced; (6) Widowed.
Limited activities “For the past six months at (1) Severely limited; (2) Limited, Information is used to
least, to what extent have but not severely; (3) Not limited. generate three dummy
you been limited because variables.
of a health problem in
activities people usually do?”
Highest school Please look at card 2. See card 2 above. Information is used to
leaving certiﬁcate What is the highest generate a maximum
school leaving certiﬁcate set of educational dummy
or school degree that you variables.
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